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Abstract
We consider a small open developing economy, whose population is bifur-
cated into a majority and a minority group, the latter lacking political in‡uence.
Agents are heterogeneous in skills, and decide whether to invest in education
when young and whether to migrate in their adulthood. Assuming a rent-
extraction basis for discrimination, we …rst endogenize ethnic discrimination
in the benchmark case of an economy closed to migration, and then explore
how migration prospects a¤ect ethnic inequality. Under the free migration
assumption, we …nd the intuitive result that migration prospects have a pro-
tective e¤ect on the minority. Moreover, the optimal discrimination rate (from
the majority’s perspective) is shown to be such that there is no migration at
equilibrium, unless the distribution of individuals’ skills exhibits marked asym-
metries. Last, we …nd that immigration restrictions set by receiving countries
have the paradoxical e¤ect of creating migration ‡ows which would otherwise
have remained latent.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The connection between migration, ethnic discrimination, and education, is a rel-
atively neglected issue in development economics.1 This is quite surprising, since
minority groups often represent a substantial proportion of a developing country’s
emigrants and are relatively highly educated. The phenomenon is di¢cult to quantify
because receiving countries generally ignore the ethnic a¢liation of their immigrants.
An exception is the recent Australian data on immigrants from Malaysia, Sri Lanka,
and Fiji, three ethnically-divided countries which have minorities subject to discrim-
ination. The data show that among the immigrants sampled, minority members are
signi…cantly over-represented and better educated than members of their respective
relevant majority group.2 This is also con…rmed by many country studies on in-
tergroup di¤erences in education and migration pro…les. For example, the studies of
Gani and Ward (1995) on Fiji, or the evidence on labor migration in Asia presented in
Martin (1991), show that members of minorities tend to be more mobile and educated
than the rest of the population, due to cultural as well as economic factors. In their
research on the sources of ethnic inequality in Vietnam, van de Walle and Gunewar-
dena (2000) also found substantial returns to migration for the educated members
of the minority. These behavioral patterns are not new to labor economists; indeed,
standard human capital theory (e.g., Levhari and Weiss, 1974, Brenner and Kiefer,
1981) suggests that members of discriminated-against minorities would massively in-
vest in education if this provides them with a means of avoiding discrimination. This
would seem to be particularly relevant in the context of migration, since education
has been shown to provide its owners with exit options (Carrington and Detragiache,
1999, Katz and Rapoport, 2000).
From a more macroeconomic perspective, there is a growing interest in the e¤ects
of ethnic fractionalization on growth. The …rst argument put forward was that ethnic
diversity might translate into political polarization, and, therefore, impede the adop-
tion of e¢cient policies.3 It was then suggested that ethnic diversity may contribute
to political instability, thereby discouraging domestic as well as foreign investments
(Barro and Lee, 1993, Alesina et al., 1996). In addition, ethnic diversity may also
cause market segmentation, thereby limiting the scope for potential economies of
scale. At the empirical level, Easterly and Levine (1997) asserted that ethnic di-
versity is central to explaining cross-country di¤erences in economic performance in
sub-Saharan Africa. They interpreted this as showing that ethnic fractionalization
leads to social con‡icts, political instability, and the adoption of ine¢cient economic
policies, including discrimination against minorities. These …ndings have been chal-
1As in Bardhan (1997), for convenience, we use the word ”ethnic” as a general label for relevant
racial, tribal, linguistic, regional or religious divisions.
2For more details on the Australian data, see Tremblay (2000).
3See Alesina and Drazen (1991), for a discussion on stabilization policies, and Schi¤ (1998), for
a general view on ethnic diversity and economic reform in Africa.
2lenged notably by Collier and Gunning (1999), who point out that fractionalization
per se is of little interest since the negative growth e¤ect of ethnic diversity only
applies in societies lacking political rights.4
Until recently, however, ethnic discrimination has mostly been treated as an ex-
ogenous trait, inherited from a country’s speci…c culture and history. In an attempt
to endogenize such discriminations and con‡icts, the recent literature on the political
economy of growth suggested two possible economic rationales for ethnic discrimina-
tion (Bardhan, 1997, Bates, 1999, Horowitz, 1998): the hostility externality, and the
redistribution motive. To use a distinction proposed by Horowitz (1998), the hostil-
ity theory proposes a hard view of ethnic con‡icts, while the redistribution theory
endorses a soft view. In the …rst approach (e.g., Wintrobe, 1996, Azam, 2000), the
group in power - the majority - has a distate for the well-being of minorities, and
aims to harm them, using the government as a (costly) means of in‡icting hostility
up to a given point. In the second approach, as advocated, for example, by Ben-
habib and Rustichini (1996), Congleton (1996), and Benabou (1996), the group in
power builds on the lack of political rights and in‡uence of the minority to promote
an ethnically biased redistribution, whether through direct or indirect means. Obvi-
ously, the hostility theory would seem to apply to phenomena that range from market
discrimination to secular con‡icts culminating in ethnic violence and civil war. By
contrast, the redistribution theory would apply mainly to governmental discrimina-
tion (access to public jobs and loans, budget allocation on an ethnic basis, ethnically
biased tax systems, etc.). The two theories, however, are not mutually exclusive, and
their di¤erences should not be overstated. On the contrary, it seems obvious that
these two types of motives can coexist and feed o¤ one another (Carlton, 1995).5
Along the lines suggested by the second approach, we assume a rent-maximizing
government, whose objective is to maximize the welfare of a privileged group (hence-
forth, the majority). In our model, people make two decisions: whether to invest in
education during their youth; and whether to emigrate as adults. Both of these are
a¤ected by the anticipated domestic discrimination, which, in our setting, takes the
form of proportional taxation of the educated fraction of the minority, with lump-sum
redistribution within the majority. These assumptions are discussed below. Instead
of focusing on the growth e¤ects of such policies, as in the above cited literature, we
focus on how migration prospects may a¤ect ethnic inequality when discrimination
is endogenous. Our approach has some similarities to that of Epstein et al. (1999),
Docquier and Rapoport (1999), and Tremblay (2000). In contrast to Docquier and
Rapoport (1999), where migrants are picked up randomly by immigration authorities,
we assume proportional taxation, as indicated above, rather than a poll tax. This
results in a self-selection process, whereby, consistently with existing data, migra-
tion is more likely for the most highly skilled (see, e.g., Carrington and Detragiache,
4See also Bluedorn (2001) for a reassessment of this empirical controversy.
5Cognitive dissonance being one of the many channels that could account for such a cumulative
process.
31999). In contrast to Epstein et al. (1999) and Tremblay (2000), where individual
productivity is given, individual productivity depends on education decisions. As a
result, from the majority’s perspective, there is a tradeo¤ between the amount of the
tax rate and the number of taxpayers, so that ethnic discrimination is endogenously
l i m i t e de v e ni nt h ec a s eo fac l o s e de c o n o m y .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the formal
framework of the model and discusses its main assumptions. Section 3 details the
results for three di¤erent possible distributions of individuals’ inherited skills, and
examines the sensitivity of the results with respect to the choice of a particular dis-
tribution. Section 4 introduces uncertainty into the model in the form of immigration
restrictions set by the receiving countries, and studies how these a¤ect equilibrium
outcomes. Section 5 o¤ers the conclusions and suggests extensions for further research.
2 A rent-maximizing model
We consider a small open developing economy, whose population is divided between
a majority group (denoted by M) and a minority group (denoted by m), the latter
lacking political in‡uence. Individuals are born with a given minimal endowment of
human capital (normalized to 1), and with heterogeneous learning abilities: each
individual is characterized by his personal ability to learn, i.e., to transform a given
educational investment into productive skills. The learning ability of an individual,





The distribution is the same for the majority and the minority.
Two generations coexist. During the …rst period, people have the possibility of
investing in education, so as to improve their productivity in the second period. The
education decision is a ”take it or leave it” choice. There is a unique educational
program which requires a …xed time cost e; expressed as a proportion of the …rst
period duration. An educated agent is endowed with 1+a e¢ciency units of labor
to supply when old. Non-educated agents, on the other hand, keep the same unitary
level of human capital over their whole lifetime. The no-investment income is assumed
to re‡ect the subsistence minimum required in that economy.
We formalize ethnic discrimination through a proportional tax, extracted on the
educated fraction of the minority, and equally redistributed among the majority. This
tax is assumed to re‡ect the various distortions in the taxation system penalizing the
minority. For example, the tax structure may be designed to penalize activities
in which ethnic minorities are over-represented, or …scal privileges may be o¤ered
to the government’s ethnic constituency. Alternatively, minority members may be
victims of …nancial extortion, or forced to use bribes or majority name-lenders to
4circumvent ethnic restrictions. It is assumed that non educated agents remain at the
subsistence level, thereby escaping taxation. Being educated, therefore, signals ability
to pay the ethnic tax, which is levied on the educated only. Last, since we are not
interested in the fate of the majority elite, or in the growth e¤ects of discrimination,
we assume for analytical convenience a lump-sum redistribution within the majority,
i.e., redistribution equally bene…ts every member of the majority, whether educated
or not.6
The constant tax rate is denoted by t. Education is assumed to provide its owners
with a passport to a discrimination-free country, whose factor prices are equal7 and
una¤ected by migration. There is a …xed migration cost C.
The education decision is taken during the …rst period, while the migration de-
cision is taken at the beginning of the second period. A minority member of type a
thus compares his life-cycle income W m
a i nt h r e ep o s s i b l es i t u a t i o n s :









[(1 ¡ e)R +1+eR] (1)
- Investing in education and staying in the home country:
W
m






[(1 ¡ e)R +1+a(1 ¡ t)] (2)
- Investing in education and emigrating:
W
m






[(1 ¡ e)R +1+a ¡ C] (3)
where R denotes the private discount rate on future earnings (1 plus the interest
rate).
The comparison of these three alternatives determines two critical ability thresh-
olds. The …rst threshold characterizes the minority member who is indi¤erent about
whether to invest in education: am = am
c1 ´ eR
1¡t. The second ability threshold char-
acterizes the educated member of the minority who is indi¤erent about whether to
emigrate: am = am
c2 ´ C
t . Agents falling in the range between the minimal ability a
and the critical ability am
c1 opt for alternative 1, agents in the range between am
c1 and
am
c2 choose alternative 2, and agents in the range between am
c2 and the maximal ability
a opt for alternative 3. To avoid trivial solutions, we make the assumption that the
agent with the highest ability would choose to invest in education in the absence of
discrimination:
Assumption 1: a ¡ eR > 0:
6Obviously, redistribution only within the educated fraction of the majority would create further
incentives for education for the majority, thus giving rise to rent-seeking activities.
7This is to neutralize the incentives for emigration based on inter-country wage di¤erentials. Such
incentives have already been extensively discussed in previous literature.
5Note that Assumption 1 does not preclude that, if am
c2 = C
t is higher than a (that
is, for su¢ciently low discrimination tax rates), no one chooses to emigrate.
Given the terms at the right hand side of equations (1)-(2)-(3), the possible alter-
natives are graphically represented in Fig. 1 for a given discrimination rate:
Figure 1 : Life-cycle income under several alternatives
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All the agents who opt for alternative 1 (no investment in education) are in zone I,
all the agents who opt for alternative 2 (education without emigration) are in zone II,
while the most capable agents, those who choose to invest in education and emigrate,
are in zone III. As the tax rate increases, zone I and III are increased while zone
II is decreased. Indeed, more discrimination, on the one hand, deters investment in
education, and, on the other hand, pushes more educated members of the minority
towards emigration. It may easily be shown that if t ¸ C
eR+C,z o n eI Ib e c o m e s
empty. In this case, no educated minority members remain in the country, so that
the discrimination revenue falls to zero.
Under the rational discrimination assumption, there are two mechanisms whereby
minority members are protected against ”excessive” discrimination. First, the tax
rate must be such that a su¢cient number of agents opt for education; second, the
tax rate must be such that a su¢cient number of educated agents choose to stay in
their origin country. Formally, zone II delimits the fraction of the minority on which
the discrimination rent is extracted. The lower bound of this interval is unambiguously
given by eR
1¡t; while the upper bound may either be C
t or a; depending on whether
some of the educated minority members actually emigrate. Typically, if C
t > a,t h e
migration cost is too high (or, alternatively, the discrimination tax rate is too low)
to induce migration. Therefore, the relevant fraction of the minority that is subject








. Note that the critical values for
the majority (which correspond to those for the minority for t =0 ) are respectively
given by aM
c1 = eR < am
c1 and aM
c2 = 1 >a m
c2. This implies: (i) that the proportion of
6the educated is always higher within the majority than in the minority; and (ii) that
none of the majority members are willing to emigrate.
Let ® denote the share of the minority in the total population and 1¡® the share
of the majority. The optimal discrimination rate from the majority’s perspective is
given by:
t
















where the per-capita rent between brackets is de…ned for 0 <t< C
eR+C; and the
integral measures the taxpayers’ average ability.
3 Endogenous discrimination under several ability
distributions
As shown in equation (4), the equilibrium discrimination tax rate strongly depends
on the minority’s ability distribution. The intuition for this is the following. Consider
a given initial level for the discrimination tax rate, t0. How does a marginal increase
in that rate a¤ect the aggregated rent extracted from the minority? On the one
hand, the gain is obvious: the educated who stay in the home country pay more.
But, on the other hand, the number of taxpayers decreases as a result of increased
emigration and a fall in the human capital formation within the minority. The …rst
e¤ect is highly detrimental for rent maximization since it a¤ects the individuals with
the highest abilities (those who pay the highest taxes). Its magnitude, and, therefore,
the total e¤ect of a marginal tax increase, is clearly depending on the ability density
at the right of C=t0. Examining this problem at a (i.e. for t0 = C=a), it is obvious
that the choice to discriminate above t0 strongly depends on the relative thickness of
the tail of the ability density function at the right hand side.
Various rent-maximization solutions may be obtained, in which the density shape
becomes more or less decreasing. To illustrate this, we consider three possible ability
distributions: (1) uniform (f(a)=U(a)=cst), perfectly symmetric around the
mean; (2) weakly decreasing, with density decreasing hyperbolically with the ability
level (f(a)=cst=a); and (3) strongly decreasing, with density decreasing with the
square of the ability level (f(a)=cst=a2). Fig. 2 gives a schematic representation of
these distributions.
7Figure 2 : The ability distribution
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3.1 The case of uniform density (un)
In the case of uniform density, the optimal discrimination tax from the majority’s
perspective may be written as:
t
¤
















Given the condition on the upper bound of the integral, two regimes may be
distinguished, depending on whether t¤
un <C = a or t¤
un >C = a. We treat this problem
in two preliminary steps, and then derive the corresponding La¤er curves, depending
on whether the upper bound of the integral is C=t or a . As apparent from Fig. 3, the
La¤er curve associated to the upper bound a (called L1) applies for t¤
un <C = a; and
the La¤er curve associated to the upper bound C=t (called L2) applies for t¤
un >C = a.
In the …nal step, we compute the general La¤er curve, which combines L1 and L2
and exhibits a discontinuity point at t¤
un = C=a.
STEP 1 : DERIVATION OF THE LAFFER CURVE L1
For t<C = a, min(a;C=t)=a; so that the aggregated rent extracted is given by
t£
h
a2 ¡ ( eR
1¡t)2
i
. The solution is obtained by setting the derivative with respect to t at





; with h1(t) ´ 1+t
(1¡t)3.
The RHS term of this equality is clearly constant and above unity. The LHS term is
an increasing and convex function of the tax rate. This gives the following result:
Lemma 1 T h eL a ¤ e rc u r v eL 1( c o r r e s p o n d i n gt ot h eL a ¤ e rc u r v ei nt h ec l o s e de c o n -
omy) has a unique interior solution: t¤
1;un 2 [0;1]. The discrimination tax t¤
1;un in-
creases with the ability range and decreases with education cost: t¤
1;un = f( a
eR), f0 > 0:
8Proof. h1(t) increases in t 2 [0;1],w i t hh1(0) = 1 and h1(1) = 1.G i v e n





for 0 <t<1; this ensures an internal solution.
This closed economy La¤er curve is represented by the L1-curve of Fig. 3. Note
that the tax rate t¤
1;un corresponds to the equilibrium solution in the closed economy
since it is not constrained by migration prospects.
STEP 2 : DERIVATION OF THE LAFFER CURVE L2
For t>C = a, min(a;C=t)=C=t; so that the aggregated rent is given by t £ h
(C
t )2 ¡ ( eR
1¡t)2
i
. The derivative of the aggregated rent with respect to t is always
negative (¡(C
t )2 ¡ (eR)2 1+t
(1¡t)2 < 0) so that this function is monotonically decreasing
in t. If migration occurs, the tax rate must be as low as possible. The maximal rent
is thus obtained if the tax is set to the lower bound t¤
2;un = C=a; as apparent from
Fig. 3 (L2 curve).
STEP 3 : DERIVATION OF THE GLOBAL LAFFER CURVE
The global La¤er curve combines L1 and L2. It is represented in bold lines on Fig.
3.
Figure 3 : The global Laffer curve and migration costs
Fig. 3.a : Low migration costs Fig. 3.b : High migration costs
Aggregated
      rent
                  L2
                                                            L1
           a C t / *
2 =         
*
1 t                              t
Aggregated
      rent
                                                 L2
                                                              L1
                                   
*
1 t            a C t / *
2 =      t
The equilibrium discrimination tax rate is given by the maximum of this global









giving the following general result:
9Proposition 1 In the case of a uniform ability distribution: (i) migration prospects
do not in‡uence the equilibrium discrimination tax rate if migration costs are suf-
…ciently high; formally, t¤
un = t¤
1;un = f( a
eR) if and only if t¤
1;un <C = a; (ii) if mi-
gration costs are su¢ciently low, the equilibrium tax rate is such that the minority
member with the highest ability is indi¤erent about whether to emigrate; formally,
t¤
un = t¤
2;un = C=a if and only if t¤
1;un >C = a.




From equation (6), t¤
un = t¤
1;un <t ¤
2;un if migration costs are high. This case
is shown in Fig. 3b, where the maximum of the closed economy La¤er curve L1
corresponds to that of the global La¤er curve. In such cases, migration prospects do
not a¤ect the level of discrimination, which is only limited by internal incentives to
invest in human capital. Since migration opportunities are not relevant, it is also
clear that there is no migration at equilibrium. On the contrary, if migration costs
are low, from equation (6), t¤
un = t¤
2;un <t ¤
1;un. This case is shown in Fig. 3a where
the maximum of the global La¤er curve corresponds to the intersection point of the
curves L1 and L2. This case is obtained when the L2 curve intersects the L1 curve to
the left of its maximum. In such cases, migration prospects reduce the rent-extracting
power of the majority, and the equilibrium tax rate is such that even the minority
members with the highest abilities choose to stay in their origin country. This is
obviously due to the fact that the relative density at the right of the distribution is
high: a higher tax rate would generate a large income loss. This also results in the
absence of any migration at equilibrium, as shown in Fig. 4.
Figure 4 : Equilibrium with a uniform distribution and low migration costs
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The following corollary emerges from Proposition 2:
10Corollary 1 (i) The equilibrium discrimination rate is a non-increasing function of
migration costs. It is strictly decreasing if migration costs are su¢ciently low; (ii)
The educational investment of minority members is a non-decreasing function of the
migration cost. It is strictly increasing if migration costs are su¢ciently low.
Minority members choosing to acquire education are those whose ability is higher
than the threshold eR
1¡t. Given the previous proposition, migration prospects lower
the tax rate and decrease the critical value.
3.2 The case of a weakly decreasing density (wd)
If the density of the distribution decreases hyperbolically with individuals’ abilities,
the optimal discrimination tax from the majority’s perspective is given by:
t
¤
















This is obtained by maximizing [ta]
min(C=t;a)
eR=(1¡t) with respect to t.
We adopt the same three-step-methodology as in the previous section.
STEP 1:DERIVATION OF L1
For t<C = a, one has to maximize at ¡ teR
1¡t (representing the L1 curve). The




a ; which clearly belongs to
the interval [0;1], i.e., the closed economy solution is an interior solution. It is clear
that the equilibrium tax rate increases with the ability range and decreases with
the educational cost. This result is very similar to that in the case of a uniform
distribution, except that it gives an explicit analytical solution.
STEP 2:DERIVATION OF L2
For t>C = a,t h eL 2c u r v ei sg i v e nb yC ¡
teR
1¡t. Again, the derivative of the L2
curve with respect to the tax rate is negative (- eR
(1¡t)2 < 0). The maximal rent is thus
obtained when the tax rate is set to the lower bound t¤
2;wd = C=a .
STEP 3 : DERIVATION OF THE GLOBAL LAFFER CURVE
The global La¤er curve combines L1 and L2 and the equilibrium discrimination




2;wd); giving the following result (which is also very similar to that in the
previous section):
Proposition 2 In the case of a hyperbolic distribution: (i) migration prospects do






a if and only if t¤
1;wd <C = a); (ii) the equilibrium tax rate
is such that the minority member with the highest ability is indi¤erent as to whether
to emigrate if migration costs are su¢ciently low (t¤
wd = t¤
2;wd = C=a if and only if
t¤
1;wd >C = a).




Fig. 3 and 4 and corollary 1 in the previous section are still valid in characterizing
the consequences of migration prospects on ethnic inequalities in the case of a weakly
decreasing ability distribution..
3.3 The case of a strongly decreasing density (sd)
If the density of the distribution is decreasing with the square of the ability level, the
optimal discrimination tax from the majority’s perspective is given by:
t
¤
















This is obtained by maximizing [t £ lna]
min(C=t;a)
eR=(1¡t) with respect to t.
STEP 1:DERIVATION OF L1
For t<C = a, the equation of the L1 curve is proportional to tln a
eR + tln(1 ¡ t).













This induces the following lemma:
Lemma 2 The L1 La¤er curve (the La¤er curve in the closed economy) has a unique
interior solution: t¤
1;sd 2 [0;1]. The discrimination tax rate t¤
1;sd increases with the
ability range and decreases with the cost of education: t¤




Proof. The function g1(t) is monotonically increasing and convex. It starts from
0( g1(0) = 0) and tends to in…nity (g1(1) = 1). Given assumption 1, ln a
eR is positive.
It follows that g1(t) intersects ln a
eR b e t w e e n0a n d1 .T h eh i g h e rln a
eR; the higher the
tax rate at the intersection point.
12STEP 2:DERIVATION OF L2
For t>C = a, the equation of L2 is proportional to tln C
eR¡tlnt+tln(1¡t).U s i n g

















This induces the following lemma:
Lemma 3 The L2 La¤er curve has a unique interior solution: t¤
2;sd 2 [0;1]. The dis-
crimination tax t¤
2;sd increases with the ability range and decreases with the education
cost t¤




Proof. The function g2(t) is monotonically increasing. It starts from minus in…n-
ity (g2(0) = ¡1) and tends to in…nity (g2(1) = 1). The RHS term ln C
eR ¡1 is either
positive or negative. It follows that g2(t) intersects ln C
eR ¡ 1 at a discrimination rate
between 0 and 1. The higher ln C
eR; the higher the tax rate at the intersection point.
In the case of a strongly decreasing distribution of ability, the L2 curve becomes
concave. It is increasing for low tax rates and decreasing for higher values of the tax
rate.
STEP 3 : DERIVATION OF THE GLOBAL LAFFER CURVE.
The global La¤er curve combines two concave curves: L1, with a maximum at
t¤
1;sd,a n dL2,w i t ham a x i m u ma tt¤
2;sd. As shown in Fig. 5, there are three possible
solutions for the equilibrium discrimination tax rate: it can either be the maximum














a (Case 1), there is no migration at equilibrium, and






1;sd (Case 2), the equilibrium discrimination rate is lower
than that obtained in the closed economy. However, as in the cases of a uniform
or weakly decreasing distribution, it is optimal for the majority to set the tax
rate so that the minority member with the highest ability is indi¤erent as to






1;sd (Case 3), as distinct from the other cases, there is
migration at equilibrium. Indeed, migration prospects reduce the rate of dis-
crimination (since t¤
sd <t ¤
1;sd), but the equilibrium tax rate induces emigration
13for the fraction of the minority with the highest abilities (since C
a <t ¤
sd). Graph-
ically, Case 3 emerges if the L2 curve intersects the L1 curve and both curves





2;sd (Case 4). Graphically, Case 4 also emerges if L2 is
positively sloped at the intersection with, but has its maximum to the right of
t¤
1;sd. However, such a case is theoretically irrelevant. Indeed, since L2 integrates
two (internal and external) detrimental e¤ects of taxation on human capital
accumulation while L1 integrates only one (internal) e¤ect, the L2 curve should
be either more decreasing or less increasing than L1 at their intersection point.
The main insights of the above discussion can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3 In the case of a strongly decreasing distribution, migration prospects




Proof. E¤ective emigration is observed in case 3. A necessary and su¢cient
condition to obtain Case 3 is that the slope of L2 must be positive at C
a: Formally,
this slope at C
a is given by - C
a¡C ¡ ln C
a¡C +l n C




The condition required for observing e¤ective migrations is likely to be satis…ed
when both the migration and the education costs are relatively low. Under such
conditions, the open economy equilibrium tax rate is lower than that obtained in the
closed economy (since the maximum of L2 must lie at the left of the maximum of L1).
In Case 3, despite the e¤ective emigration of its most skilled members, the minority
is still protected by migration prospects since the discrimination rate decreases.
8As a matter on fact, since only the most highly-skilled individuals emigrate, this situation
corresponds to a brain drain phenomenon. On the possible growth e¤ects of such a brain drain, see
e.g. Mountford (1997), and Beine et al (2001).
14Figure 5 : Configurations with a strongly decreasing distribution
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4 The consequences of migration restrictions (mr)
Until now, we have assumed a context of free labor mobility. In the real world, of
course, prospective migrants are often constrained by immigration restrictions set
by receiving countries. Such restrictive immigration policies, which are increasingly
selective and biased towards the most educated, explain at least partially the overall
tendency for migration rates to be much higher for the educated (Carington and
Detragiache, 1999). However, individual skills are not perfectly observable (while
educational attainments are), and migrants’ selection, even for the educated, generally
15proceeds through a kind of random selection among the candidates with appropriate
educational record. As a result, uncertainty is introduced in the migration process. To
account for such uncertainty, we assume that only a fraction q<1 of the candidates
for immigration is e¤ectively allowed to immigrate, while the complementary fraction
1 ¡ q is forced to remain in the home country. For analytical convenience, we limit
our analysis to the case in which the ability distribution is weakly decreasing.9
The rent-maximizing government now faces the following problem:
t
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We use the same three steps procedure as before:
STEP 1:DERIVATION OF L1
For t<C = a, we obtain the same L1 curve as in the case of free migration. The






STEP 2:DERIVATION OF L2
For t>C = a, the expected L2 curve now depends on the relative immigration
quota: (1 ¡ q)ta + qC ¡ teR
1¡t.T h e L2 curve has a concave shape and its derivative
((1¡q)a¡
eR
(1¡t)2) is positive for low tax rates and negative for high tax rates. Formally,
it is clear that L2 di¤ers from zero if the tax rate is zero. Nevertheless, recall that
this L2 curve is only de…ned for tax rates higher than C=a. At the left of C=a,t h e
actual La¤er curve is given by L1.
Lemma 4 In the case of a weakly decreasing (hyperbolic) distribution with a migra-









Proof. This clearly follows from the derivative of the L2 curve.
It is worth noting that this maximum is relevant only if t¤
2;mr < C
a.
STEP 3 : DERIVATION OF THE GLOBAL LAFFER CURVE
This interior solution now di¤ers from that obtained in the free mobility case. The









. Consequently, the results in terms of discrimination and in
terms of emigration ‡ows are likely to be di¤erent than in the case of free migration.
More precisely,
9This is the simplest analytical case. The essence of the results would not be a¤ected by the use
of another ability distribution.
16Proposition 4 In the case of a weakly decreasing (hyperbolic) distribution with a
migration restriction at rate 0 <q<1: (i) the equilibrium discrimination rate is lower
or equal to that obtained in the closed economy (t¤
mr · t¤
1;mr); (ii) in contrast to the free
migration case, migration restrictions increase the equilibrium rate of discrimination
if the quota rate is low (1 ¡ q> eRa
(a¡C)2), but has no e¤ect on discrimination if the
relative quota is su¢ciently high (1 ¡ q< eRa
(a¡C)2).
Proof. This is apparent on Fig. 6.
Graphically, the global La¤er curve still combines L1 and L2: Three possible
con…gurations now have to be distinguished (see Figure 6):
² If 1 ¡
q
eR




a, migration costs are so high that the closed-
economy solution applies despite migration prospects.




a < 1 ¡
q
eR
a ; the L2 curve intersects the L1 curve with a
negative slope. It is then optimal for the majority to set the tax rate at C
a; in
order to avoid the emigration of the most educated fringe of the minority. In
this case, immigration restrictions do not modify the solution as compared to
the case of free mobility.







a (i.e., if 1¡q> eRa
(a¡C)2), the L2 curve inter-
sects the L1 curve with a positive slope. In contrast to the case of free mobility,
the level of discrimination is increased and migration out‡ows are observed.
In such a case, therefore, we …nd, paradoxically, that immigration restrictions
spark emigration within the ranks of the minority and have the unexpected ef-
fect of increasing the level of discrimination experienced by remaining minority
members.10
10Note, however, that as distinct from Docquier and Rapoport (1999), the equilibrium discrimi-
nation rate in the partial mobility case is never higher than the one obtained in the closed-economy.
17Figure 6 : Optimal discrimination with migration restrictions













                              t*             t













                t*                          t












            Aggregated rent
           t*                          t
185C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we adopted a political economy approach to ethnic discrimination in
developing countries. Assuming a rent-extraction basis for discrimination, we mod-
eled discrimination as a …nancial penalty levied on each educated minority member
and equally redistributed among the majority. There are, therefore, two sources of
ethnic inequality in our model: on the one hand, discrimination lowers the return
to human capital for the minority group; on the other hand, this, in turn, decreases
the number of minority members who invest in education. Focussing on the impact
of migration prospects on the optimal tax rate from the majority’s perspective, we
found the following results.
First, taking the closed-economy (no mobility) as a benchmark case, we found
the intuitive result that if there are unlimited exit options to a discrimination-free
country (full mobility case), such migration prospects are likely to protect the mi-
nority via a decrease in the equilibrium domestic level of discrimination (providing
that migration costs are su¢ciently low). Under such circumstances, investment in
education is fostered among the minority, and ethnic inequality decreases. Second,
the equilibrium discrimination rate under full mobility has been shown to be strongly
a¤ected by the thickness of the ability distribution tail on the right hand side. If it
is su¢ciently thick (as in the cases of uniform or weakly decreasing ability distribu-
tion), the equilibrium tax rate is such that the minority member with the highest
ability is indi¤erent as to whether to emigrate. If it is su¢ciently thin (as is the case
for strongly decreasing ability distributions), on the contrary, migration out‡ows are
e¤ectively observed at equilibrium. Third, compared to the free migration case, we
found that highly restrictive quotas are likely to increase the level of discrimination
imposed on the minority group, thus inducing emigration from among its ranks. In
such cases, immigration quotas have the paradoxical e¤ect of increasing ethnic dis-
crimination in the source country and creating migration ‡ows which would otherwise
have remained latent.
The issue of ethnic discrimination and con‡ict in developing countries is a very
sensitive question, and one should be extremely cautious before deriving policy im-
plications from a purely theoretical analysis. One immediate legitimate interrogation
concerns the motivation at work behind ethnic discrimination. From this perspec-
tive, the main testable implication of our model is that, everything else being equal,
ethnically divided developing countries for which migration costs are substantial, or
immigration quotas to the US and the EU are binding, should have their ethnic mi-
norities subject to higher levels of domestic discrimination.11 Regarding policy issues,
it is clear that there is a growing concern for the fate of minority groups at the inter-
11Migration costs are known to increase with the distance to the receiving country and to decrease
with the size of the community network at destination (Carrington et al., 1996). Regarding the
measurement of immigration restrictions, the sending country’s total population has been shown to
provide a good proxy to evaluate whether immigration quotas are binding (Beine et al., 2001).
19national level. In an attempt to monitor the behavior of oppressive governments and
provide protection to such groups, the international community has recently made use
of its right of ingerence, threatening to implement or actually imposing economic sanc-
tions, aid conditionality, and, occasionally, military intervention. To the extent that
ethnic discrimination is rationally and socially organized for redistributive purposes,
our analysis suggests that, alongside such traditional incentive/sanction mechanisms,
targeted immigration policy might provide a cost-e¤ective means of protecting ethnic
minorities.12
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